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1. INTRODUCTION
The crisis that began in Thailand in July 1997 has grown now
to the point where it represents perhaps the most significant eco-
nomic event since the Great Depression. Not only has unemploy-
ment and poverty in the region soared and output plummeted,
but global growth has been seriously affected. Indeed, by some
calculations, even assuming a relatively rapid return of the global
economy to sustained growth, the total loss of output, relative to
the previous trend path, is in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
Pundits have drawn the new lessons from the crisis: (a) improve
your financial institutions, (b) improve corporate governance, and
(c) improve transparency.
And they have used the occasion of the crisis to reinforce old
lessons: (a) do not run large current account deficits, and (b) do
not have an overvalued exchange rate.
At the same time, they have admitted that some of the key
lessons of earlier crises are not applicable: Unlike the Latin Ameri-
can crisis, inflation was low, government deficits were low, and
savings rates were high. The crisis was a crisis of private sector
indebtedness, not public indebtedness.
These are good lessons, and countries would be well advised
to heed them. Doing so will reduce the chance of a crisis, making
a country less vulnerable, and perhaps reducing the magnitude of
the downturn should a crisis occur. However, I do not think these
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are the main lessons that should be drawn from the East Asia
crisis: following these precepts will surely not inoculate a country
against a future crisis. To be sure, by definition, one will not have
a financial sector crisis if one has a strong financial system—that
is a tautology. The question is, what does it take to have a strong
financial system?
To be sure, with sufficient transparency, investors will not put
their money into a country that is on the brink of a crisis, and
the withdrawal of money will thus not pose a problem. But it may
be important to recall that the last set of major crises occurred in
Scandinavia, perhaps the set of countries with the most transparent
institutions. And most of the relevant information—including the
information about the degrees of transparency and the problems
in the corporate and financial sector—was not only available, but
widely discussed prior to the crisis. Western banks were lending
to these countries, despite excessively high leverage in many firms.
The experiences of Scandinavia well demonstrates that misguided
investment need not be blamed in crony capitalism—even if crony
capitalism in East Asia might have exacerbated the underlying
problems. Indeed, real estate bubbles, a central feature of the
crisis in several of the East Asian economies, have been ubiquitous
throughout the world. While weak (and badly regulated) financial
institutions are both cause and consequence, one hardly needs to
examine special features of the Asian economy to account for
these bubbles, their eventual bursting, and the disruption that
results.
I shall argue in this lecture that while there is an important set
of lessons to be learned from the crisis, the lessons are somewhat
different from those being put forward by much of the popular
press and many politicians in the more advance countries. The
lessons I would emphasize are these:
1. Rapid financial and capital account liberalization—without
the commensurate strengthening of regulatory institutions
and safety nets—exposes countries to high levels of risk that
they are ill-prepared to absorb. The benefits of the liberaliza-
tion, especially in countries with high savings rate, are limited,
and further qualified by the costs of the disruptions that they
are likely to experience. While capital account liberalization,
through diversification, is supposed to facilitate growth at
the same time that it reduces risk, in practice it seems to be
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associated with higher levels of risk without commensurate
increases in growth or investment.
2. The international financial architecture has some fundamen-
tal weaknesses, as evidenced by the increasingly frequent and
severe crises, which need to be addressed by the international
community.
3. Among the reforms that are most needed are those that
would stabilize short-term capital flows and more effectively
and quickly address systemic bankruptcy. They also need to
strengthen their safety nets and try to reduce the vulnerability
of their economy, including the strengthening of automatic
stabilizers.
4. Countries need to seek a congruence between the risks to
which they expose themselves, the safety nets that they have
provided for their most vulnerable, the automatic stabilizers
that they have put into place within their economies, and
the policy responses to crises when they occur.
In addition, I would argue that the crisis also serves to remind
us of old lessons—too easily forgotten:
1. Capitalist economies, without a strong government role, are
prone to marked fluctuations and frequent crises.
2. Before the advent of strong financial regulation and deposit
insurance, financial crises were frequent and led to severe
economic downturns. Such crises were often associated with
high leverage and/or real estate bubbles.
3. Without government intervention to restore the economy to
full employment, economic downturns can be unnecessarily
deep and prolonged.
2. WHY DID PEOPLE MISS THE CRISIS?
In the aftermath of any major event—and the Asian crisis quali-
fies as a major event—journalists and politicians inevitably search
for explanations and interpretations. Their quest is understand-
able: they wish to identify some salient aspect of the economy
that is awry. Ideally, they would like to draw some lesson that
reinforces previously held viewpoints. Citizens and readers may
want assurance that the calamity is not likely to touch them. The
weaknesses that gave rise to the crisis are “foreign”—likely to
befall those who, for one reason or the other, have not adhered
to the rules of the game.
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In the case of the East Asia crisis, the explanations may serve
another purpose: Western lenders have a strong incentive to shift
the blame—they, after all, diligently ascertained the creditworthi-
ness of borrowers. How could they be expected to have done
better, given the lack of transparency of the borrowers? Never
mind that the lack of transparency was widely noted beforehand,
and that, if anything, the countries were becoming more transpar-
ent! (Furman and Stiglitz, 1999.)
Those who pushed forward the agenda of capital and financial
market liberalization have still further motives in shifting blame.
They clearly do not want to assume any of the blame for the crisis.
There had been an active debate both within government and
academia concerning precisely these issues. There were many, for
instance, who worried that pushing the Koreans towards faster
financial and capital account liberalization, before the associated
regulatory mechanisms had been developed and before the high
debt equity ratios could be reduced, was inviting precisely the
kind of calamity that occurred. Critics that might well have said “I
told you so,” and taken a critical position untouched by “Monday
morning quarterbacking” have been surprisingly silent on these
matters, focusing instead on how to best proceed from here.
But while there is a natural quest for easy explanations, the
burden on economists is heavier: as instructive as anecdotes may
be, far more is required to explain the recent chain of events. If
the errors in management of these countries were so obvious, the
crisis should have been predicted. After all, many of the commonly
cited variables, such as Thailand’s trade deficit, were widely noted
before the crisis. If one remembers the days before the crisis,
however, it is clear that it was not expected. Credit ratings were
favorable; risk spreads were falling; and few economists were
sounding any serious alarms. Note that credit ratings and risk
spreads represent summary statistics—overall judgments of ana-
lysts and the market. They represent the aggregation of the plusses
and minuses that inevitably characterize any country. It does little
good, after the fact, to cite some negative that was recognized,
perhaps in a footnote, and respond “I told you so! Had you only
read my footnotes carefully, you would not have invested there.”
Every nation’s economy has problems, and if one only invested
in countries in which there were no “warnings,” no risks, and
no negative footnotes, one would invest in few if any emerging
markets.
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Perhaps more striking is the fact that even after the crisis had
begun—and attention had begun to focus on potential weaknesses
in the region—there was still little anticipation of the impending
disaster. In September 1997, almost all knowledgeable opinion
held that Indonesia had been unfairly contaminated by Thailand,
and that its quick policy response had successfully staved off the
crisis. As late as December 1997 the Consensus Forecast for Indo-
nesia still expected a positive 6.1% growth. It was not just that
people did not expect the crisis to occur; even after the East Asia
crisis attracted the attention and concentration of investors, they
consistently underestimated its scope and severity.
After the crisis initially began, there was still a general sense
of confidence in East Asia, a belief that the downturn would be
short and shallow. To be sure, there were good reasons for this
confidence—the East Asia miracle was real. Not only had GDP
increased enormously in the region, but poverty had also been
dramatically reduced, literacy increased, and health improved.
Overall, poverty rates for East Asia fell from roughly 60% in 1975
to roughly 20% in 1997.1
Although it is fashionable today to say these countries were
vulnerable, it should be remembered that for 30 years they had
demonstrated not only higher growth rates than elsewhere in the
world, but less vulnerability: two of the East Asian countries had
no years of negative growth, and two had only 1 year—a far better
record than any of the OECD countries. If they were vulnerable,
it was a newly acquired vulnerability, suggesting that one should
look to changes in policy (such as recently adopted policies of
financial and capital market liberalization) as the source of vulner-
ability.
But vulnerability, if it is to mean anything, should mean that
these countries had characteristics that increased the probability
of a financial or currency crisis. That is a question that needs to
be addressed by standard statistical techniques, not by the kinds of
anecdotes that politicians, journalists, and a few economic pundits
like. In a Brookings article, Jason Furman and I reran some of
the leading crisis prediction models using data from 1996 in an
effort to see if they would have predicted the crisis beginning in
1997. Looking at the plusses and minuses of each country, did the
affected countries have a higher than average probability of a
1 World Bank Statistical Information Management and Analysis (SIMA) database.
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crisis? We found that although the models raised some warnings
about countries like Brazil and Russia, they completely missed
the crisis in East Asia—often assigning a lower-than-average prob-
ability of crisis for the key countries. (Our analysis included rerun-
ning the leading model looking at crises in the financial sector.)
According to these models, there were many more vulnerable
countries; that is, if the countries of East Asia were vulnerable,
so, too, are a host of other countries.
To put it more plainly, if a variable like “lack of transparency”
is alleged to be a “cause” of a crisis, countries that have that
characteristics should have crises, and those that do not should
not. But many of the most transparent countries (like those in
Scandinavia) have been among those strongly affected by crises
in the last decade, and many of the least transparent countries
have not had crises. There are several factors that might jointly
“cause” a crisis, and that is precisely why one needs to use more
sophisticated econometric techniques that can take into account
multiple attributes. Yet even these multiple attribute models sug-
gest that the countries of East Asia were not really highly vulnera-
ble—at least not from an ex ante perspective. The standard macro-
economic and financial variables simply did not predict or add up
to a crisis.
Knowing this should make us more forgiving of the domestic
policies of crisis countries in the run up to the crisis. If the best
economic models say that the macroeconomic policies were not
heading towards a crisis, why should a Thai finance minister or
Indonesian central bank governor have known better? It is hard to
blame their policies when these policies—viewed in summary—did
not seem wrong at the time. To be sure, Thailand had a current
account deficit, which (surely in retrospect) did not appear sustain-
able. But it was being used to finance private investment, and the
private investment was presumably yielding a return in excess of
the interest rate that would have to be paid on it. If one believes
in private markets, such a deficit should have been sustainable.
If one had confidence in private market investment decisions, only
if one believed that the investment was predicated on a bailout
(i.e., that there were serious moral hazard problems) or otherwise
entailed large government subsidies, should one have been worried.
There is yet another important implication of the East Asia
crisis, especially critical as we consider reforming our international
financial architecture: the fact that the East Asian countries were
evidently vulnerable suggests that a wide range of countries are
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also vulnerable to possibly self-fulfilling crises. Those who believe
that crises are always the result of bad fundamentals have not
succeeded in identifying that set of fundamentals. And until they
do, the presumption is and should be that crises can affect any
or most countries.
Another one of the easy explanations for the crisis is that there
was a loss of confidence. Some pundits and economists have begun
to wander off into the realm of market psychology—a task for
which they are eminently unqualified and in which their predictive
powers seem eminently unimpressive. Repeatedly, they have as-
serted that some “package” or “action” would restore market
confidence. And when it failed to do so, they produced a host of
ex post explanations (reminiscent of Freudian psychologists of
old, who could never be proven wrong): the country failed to
faithfully execute their directives; some unanticipated (and pre-
sumably unanticipatable) event had occurred that had undermined
the effects of the prescription. Too little attention was paid to the
ranges in beliefs, access to information, and circumstances—and,
therefore, different reactions—of the various participants in the
market, from those on Wall Street to those in Jakarta.
In contrast to these largely unscientific and unsuccessful at-
tempts to dabble into amateur market psychology, there has been
serious research into formulating formal models, both of bubbles
bursting (a central feature of the Thai experience) and of multiple
equilibria. These models with self-fulfilling “crises” have drawn
attention to the nature of the policy regime. The rules of the
game determine whether multiple equilibria exist and affect the
likelihood of a bubble occurring. The countries of East Asia had
moved towards financial and capital liberalization over the last
decade. This led to a large inflow of capital and the associated
problems of real estate bubbles and exchange rate management.
At the same time, the open capital account increased the possibility
of a massive outflow of capital.
In our Brookings article, we took a closer look at what could
macroeconomic policy have done better, given the financial poli-
cies, and concluded that even in retrospect, it is not obvious what
the errors were. Different economists have come up with different
answers to “what should have been done.” For instance, there is
little evidence of a serious overvaluation of most of the currencies,
certainly not of Korea. There is some concern that had Thailand
floated its currency, its exchange rate would have appreciated and
reserves would have become smaller, making the eventual crash
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of the currency potentially even larger. Although some have sug-
gested that Thailand should have reduced government spending,
it already was running a fiscal surplus and its long-run problems
were related to an underinvestment in human capital and infra-
structure. Should they have allowed the private sectors’ seeming
desire to build empty office buildings crowd out needed public
investment?
We know that bad public macropolicies can lead to crises. One
of the lessons of the East Asia crisis is that the private sector can
also make bad investments. Markets throughout the world—from
the inception of capitalism—have been characterized by bubbles.
There is such emphasis on financial sector regulation precisely
because unregulated financial markets and financial panics have
played such an important role in the volatility of capitalism. This
is nothing new. The recent government intervention in the United
States in the case of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM)
demonstrates that even today, even with all the warnings that have
been sounded about excessive leverage, seemingly well-regulated
American banks have lent to a firm engaged in nontransparent
transactions, resulting in higher leverage than evidenced anywhere
in Korea. It is, thus, alleged that a single firm was in a position,
through its immense bank leverage, to give rise to systemic risks
for the global economy.
The econometric analysis provides one further lesson: the one
new variable that appears consistently important in explaining
which countries experienced a crisis is the ratio of short-term debt
to reserves. This variable was omitted from earlier analyses, partly
because it is hard to justify. Theoretically, after all, in a country
with convertible currency, domestic assets can be converted easily
into foreign currency. The multiple equilibria models provide a
possible rationale: if all investors come to believe that this is an
important variable (or that others believe that it is an important
variable), such that when that ratio exceeds a critical threshold,
there will be a currency run on the country, then there will be a
crisis when that variable exceeds that threshold.
For whatever reason, countries in which that variable is high
have faced an increased probability of a crisis. This, in turn, has
strong implications for capital account liberalization. Consider a
poor country in which the ratio of short-term, foreign-denomi-
nated liabilities to reserves is currently at the threshold (unity),
and assume that a firm within that country borrows $100 million
from an American bank paying 18% interest. The government of
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that poor country must then increase its reserves by $100 million,
buying US treasury bills at 4% interest. In effect, that country is
borrowing at 18% and lending at 4%. It is difficult to fathom how
that is a growth-enhancing strategy—though it is easy to see why
the United States might find such a deal attractive.
There is a final and important lesson that emerges from this
discussion: the need for robust systems, designed to take account
of human fallibility and institutional imperfections. Nuclear power
plants and airplanes have redundant safety systems. If one part
fails, the system will still works because there are additional back-
ups. The system is designed, moreover, to survive the lapse of
attention on the part of one engineer. Should not our international
financial architecture exhibit a similar degree of robustness?
If there were a single accident on a road, it is reasonable to
blame the driver. If, however, there are dozens of accidents at
the same curve in the road, one should at least ask whether the
road needs to be redesigned. To carry the automobile metaphor
one step forward: in designing a car, before we put in a high
powered engine, we need to know that there are both good tires
and a good driver. Opening up capital markets was a potentially
high powered engine (though in practice it did not prove to be
the case). And at the time capital markets were liberalized, the
tires (the regulatory systems) were far from up to the task of
holding to the road underneath the high power engine, and macro-
management was evidently not up to the task of navigating the
sharp curves.
3. MITIGATING THE SEVERITY OF THE CRISIS
No matter how hard we try to avoid crises, there will be crises.
No country has avoided all real estate booms, although good
policies can reduce their frequency. What can good policies do
to reduce the magnitude of the downturn?
First, governments should work to put into place automatic
stabilizers. In more developed countries, tax and welfare programs
act as automatic stabilizers; in many LDCs, automatic stabilizers
are weak or absent. Indeed, the structure of the East Asian coun-
tries had features that led to instability: the high leverage meant,
for instance, that increased interests rate, even for short periods,
had large adverse effects on net worth. And as net worth eroded,
there would be a large contraction in economic activity and an
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increasing incidence of bankruptcy. The feedback between the
real and financial sector served to exacerbate the impact of shocks.
Second, the way in which financial policies are typically imple-
mented contributes to instability. Consider what happens if capital
adequacy standards are rigidly enforced. Assume that when a
crisis hits, a country is at its limit. Then, as defaults rise and bank
net worth declines, either new capital sources have to be found
or lending must decrease. But the midst of crisis is hardly an ideal
time for raising new capital, and as a result, lending typically
contracts. This naturally further weakens the economy, leading
to more bankruptcies, and lower net worth, and perhaps an even
greater shortfall in capital adequacy. This dramatically emphasizes
the difference between systemic policies and policies affecting an
individual institution, a point to which I shall return later in the
context of bankruptcy. Rigorous enforcement of capital adequacy
standards in the case of an isolated bank facing troubles is mark-
edly different from the rigorous enforcement of those standards
in the case of a systemic crisis. (More generally, it can be shown that
optimal regulation of banks should not entail excessive reliance
on capital adequacy standards) (Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz,
1998).
Third, the strategy for dealing with financial restructuring has
to be designed to mitigate, not exacerbate the economic crisis. A
key goal here must be the maintenance of credit flows. Typically,
as an economy faces a crisis, credit flows are impeded. There can
exist a bankruptcy chain: a bankruptcy of one firm will have
adverse effects on suppliers and customers. As firms worry about
the probability of bankruptcy of suppliers and customers, they
curtail the availability of normal trade credit. Similarly, banks
facing declining net worth and worsening prospects reduce the
flow of credit. These normal reactions in an economic downturn
are obviously exacerbated in financial crises. Weak banks—banks
that fail to meet the basic capital adequacy standards and are on
the verge of insolvency (or beyond)—often need to be restruc-
tured. But this can be done in better ways or worse ways. In
particular, they can be done in ways that impede the already
limited flow of credit. The way financial restructuring was con-
ducted in the cases of United States in the S & L crisis, and
recently in Indonesia, provide examples of such success and fail-
ure, respectively. In the United States relatively few banks were
closed down, and most were merged with stronger ones—typically
over a weekend so that customers of the bank barely noticed the
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change in management. In Indonesia, by contrast, 16 private banks
were closed down, there were intimations that still more weak
banks might be shut down, and depositors were put on notice that
they were at risk. The resulting run on the remaining private banks
was no surprise, especially as there were safer alternatives: state
banks (which many believed had the government’s implicit guar-
antee) and foreign banks (which many believed were sounder).
But even if these safe havens had not been available, depositors
could, as a result of the open capital account, have taken out their
money and put it into foreign banks (thereby avoiding at the same
time the downside risk of devaluation). As private banks, thus,
were weakened, the supply of credit was further curtailed, contrib-
uting to the downward spiral of the economy. (Furthermore, gov-
ernments need to realize that financial crises may alter key parame-
ters in the standard reduced form relationships, so traditional
indicators may be misleading guides to policy. For instance, credit
availability may be reduced, even as interest rates fall.)
Fourth, governments must recognize that even countries with
the most advanced institutional structures have had a hard time
creating the regulatory environment that insulates them against
the full impact of such shocks. Less developed countries have less
capacity—and the very process of financial market liberalization
has weakened that capacity at precisely the time that is needed
to be strengthened, as government regulatory agencies found it
impossible to compete against the booming private sector in re-
taining highly trained individuals. Moreover, less developed coun-
tries face greater risks (partly because their economies are smaller
and, therefore, less diversified). And derivatives have made a task
all the more difficult, with even the best regulators finding it
a daunting challenge—as the Long-Term Capital Management
debacle this year made so painfully clear.
Fifth, governments should complement automatic stabilizers
with discretionary countercyclical policies, actively seeking to
avoid or at least reduce the magnitude of the economic downturns
that almost inevitably follow upon financial crises. In doing so,
government needs to invoke all the basic lessons of modern macro-
management:
1. Policies need to take account of the fact that there are lags,
and thus must be based on the forecasts of where the econ-
omy will be in 6 or 9 months time. It simply will not do to
base current policy on the current state of the economy,
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when there is overwhelming evidence that the economy is
about to go into a major economic downturn. East Asia
illustrates this point clearly: the economies were initially in
rough economic balance (as evidenced, for instance, by the
absence of strong inflationary pressures); the major down-
turns of the stock market and the currency, combined with
the bursting of the real estate boom in Thailand and the
rising tide of bankruptcy in Korea, provided strong evidence
of a likely deficiency in domestic aggregate demand. Addi-
tionally, the typically long lags in the export growth might
have suggested that the growth of exports would be incapable
of quickly filling the gap. Anyone attuned to the lessons of
modern finance—to the strong adverse impacts of financial
crises on the availability of credit—might have predicted an
even greater reduction in domestic demand and the possibil-
ity of exports growth being impaired by supply limitations.
2. Although good macropolicy constantly makes adjustment
midstream, as new information about the present state and
the future prospects of the economy becomes available, it
simply will not do to say (as I have heard more than once)
that if a downturn does materialize, we will at that point
advocate less contractionary policies. By then it is too late,
and it will take months to fully reverse course.
3. Sound macropolicy must take into account the nonlinearities
and irreversibilities: large economic downturns lead to mas-
sive bankruptcies, with a huge loss of informational and orga-
nizational capital. Restarting an economy after such a severe
downturn is not easy.
4. Sound macropolicy must taken into account the risks—not
only who bears the risks, but their asymmetries: I have al-
ready noted the difficulty of reversing a severe downturn.
For an economy with a history of low inflation, even a moder-
ate bout of inflation can be easy to contain and reverse. By
contrast, the disruption caused by a deep recession can leave
lasting scars—not just in the form of organizational capital,
but in the form of malnutrition and interrupted education
among the very poor.
5. Advocates of contractionary policies argue that contraction
(or at least the high interest rates and expenditure cuts that
lead to it) is necessary for the restoration of confidence.
Though this is more a matter for a market psychologist than
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for an economist (Krugman, 1998), and there is little empiri-
cal evidence to support that hypothesis—I remain convinced
that it is very hard to restore confidence in an economy that
is going into a deeper recession or depression (bearing in
mind the reaction of investors both outside and inside the
country). Worse still, because there is strong evidence that
economic weakness gives rise to political and social instabil-
ity, these instabilities reinforce the weakening of confidence
in the economy.
At the very least, those who advocate these contractionary
policies have a heavy burden: not only do they need to establish
that these policies are likely to succeed in restoring “confidence
in the economy,” but that there are not better ways—less painful
ways—especially less painful to the innocent bystanders.
There is a curious logic in these contractionary policies: eco-
nomic management is intended to maintain full employment and
growth. To argue for contractionary policies—for a recession or
depression today—one implicitly must argue that but for these
policies, there would be an even worse economic future, a still
worse recession or a prolonged period of much slower growth.
Consider East Asia. Assume firms there had been encouraged to
make full use of the bankruptcy laws (and, if the countries did
not have laws with a good “Chapter 11,” they had quickly passed
such laws). The consequence would have been to put into place
an effective standstill on debt (which remember, was private)—far
preferable to what has happened so often, the nationalization of
private liabilities. The worst that might have happened is that
these companies would have a hard time accessing foreign capital
in the immediately ensuing years (although the experience is that
after an orderly bankruptcy, firms do regain access to capital
markets rather quickly). But with savings rates in excess of 30%,
and with marginal returns in investment already relatively low,
even this might have had a negligible effect on their growth—
certainly the deep recessions and depressions might have been
avoided. And in any case, firms in deep economic recessions or
depressions typically do not have access to outside capital!
This brings me to the fifth major part of a strategy to mitigate the
downturn: putting into place an effective bankruptcy law designed
explicitly to deal with systemic bankruptcies arising out of large
macroeconomic disturbances such as those associated with large
devaluations and huge increases in interest rates. Let me say a
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word about bankruptcy, an institution that, until recently, has
received too little attention (though its profound implications for
economic theory has long been recognized). (See, for instance,
Stiglitz, 1969, and Stiglitz, 1972). I have argued elsewhere that a
keystone in the development of modern capitalism has been lim-
ited liability and bankruptcy laws. (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1992).
Modern bankruptcy laws attempt to balance sometimes conflicting
considerations: promoting orderly workouts so that business val-
ues can be retained and production losses can be kept to a mini-
mum, and providing appropriate incentives so that those engaged
in risky behavior bear the consequences of their action. Incentive
issues arise at a number of junctures: before the loan has been
entered into; after the loan has been made but before bankruptcy
appears imminent; before bankruptcy occurs but after it appears
that there is a significant chance of default; and after bankruptcy
actually occurs. Different bankruptcy rules have different effects
at each of these stages.
Discussions of bankruptcy often center on equity: on the “rights”
of debtors and creditors. Although equity considerations are im-
portant, so long as the rules are clearly specified, the terms of the
contract will reflect these differences in rules. For instance, a rule
that gave debtors more rights after bankruptcy would typically
be associated with higher interest rates at the time the loan was
made. There are, of course, both efficiency and distributional
considerations: the higher interest rates may, for instance, disad-
vantage good borrowers. (While going forward, it is important to
have clarity about bankruptcy rules, there are difficult problems
concerning how to deal with the current situation. Here, issues
of equity are paramount: there needs to be a sense of fairness in
burden sharing. I would argue that the central concern at this
juncture, however, should be the restoration of the economy,
which includes designing rules with the appropriate forward-look-
ing incentives. The long-run incentive and equity issues need to
be addressed within the context of the redesign of the underlying
bankruptcy law.) In the international context, the flight of capital
or withdrawal of short-term debt does not remove any of the
actual factories. (Except in extreme situations—such as now seem
to be occurring in some of the East Asia countries, where not
only is there asset stripping, but the assets are being shipped
abroad. Some of the so-called revival of exports is little more than
a shipment of the productive assets of the country abroad—hardly
a victory for economic recovery!) The goal should be to ensure
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that these productive assets continue to produce and that the
assets are not stripped away.
Systemic bankruptcy law needs to be distinguished from the
bankruptcy laws prevailing in most countries, which are intended
to address the failure of isolated firms. There are several salient
differences:
1. The inferences we can make about the quality of manage-
ment when all firms face bankruptcy are markedly differ
from the inferences which can be drawn when a single firm
faces bankruptcy: there is a stronger presumption that an
event that even a “reasonably good manager” could not have
anticipated has occurred.
2. Even ascertaining the net worth of a firm becomes difficult
when there is systemic bankruptcy, because many of the assets
of a corporation are claims on other firms that are themselves
bankrupt. Ascertaining the net worth of any firm thus entails
solving a complex, simultaneous equation problem.
3. The resources required to work out an isolated bankruptcy
are huge, and there are many critics of present U.S. practices
who question whether the benefits are worth the costs. But
how can a poor country, with 50 to 75 percent of its firms
in bankruptcy, afford these costs? To put it another way,
there are simply not enough bankruptcy specialists within
the countries (and perhaps in the world at large).
4. Most importantly, bankruptcy proceedings are often pro-
longed, and while there are significant costs to the delays
(which themselves may be a manifestation of one of the
inefficiencies that often arise out of bargaining problems
with imperfect information) (Farrell, 1987) under systemic
bankruptcy, the social costs are systemic, and may signifi-
cantly exceed the private costs: the macroeconomic conse-
quences of delay are simply too great to bear. Although
delaying the resolution of an isolated bankruptcy has no
serious macroeconomic effects, delays in the resolution of
bankruptcies affecting a significant fraction of the firms
within the economy have marked aggregate consequences.
5. There is not a single Pareto-efficient set of bankruptcy rules,
as some of those pushing bankruptcy laws on less developed
countries seem to suggest. There are fundamental trade-offs
in the design of bankruptcy laws, a point made evident by
the heated debate over reform of the bankruptcy laws in the
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United States during the past year. In short, the task of the
economic adviser is not to tell the country which bankruptcy
law to have, to give it a single “prescription,” but to lay out
clearly the consequences of alternative models. I worry that
some of the advice now being proffered falls far short of this
ideal.
The systemic nature of bankruptcy laws in the crisis countries
calls for reforms in bankruptcy law—such as a speedy “super
Chapter 11” in which the presumption is that existing management
would remain in place, a financial plan would be presented that
would restructure the liabilities (e.g., forced debt to equity swaps,
with foreign debts valued at a rate, say, the higher of the current
rate and 30% below the average rate prevailing over the preceding
6 months) with existing management/shareholders able to retain
sufficient equity interests to provide them with adequate incen-
tives. These “default options” would provide the backdrop for a
speedy resolution of the debtor–creditor bargaining problem. To
be sure, this proposal (one of many that could be discussed) is
one that puts a higher premium on debtor rights compared to
those that creditor committees might propose. Critics would say
that this will be have dire consequences for the flow of capital; it
will force borrowers to pay higher interest rates. But that is pre-
cisely the point: currently, borrowers are not paying the full costs
of the risks that their (collective) actions impose on society. This
bankruptcy law would put the two in closer alignment. (Moreover,
in some models with multiple equilibrium, these new rules might,
in fact, result in the elimination of the bad equilibrium—the equi-
librium with a low exchange rate. Knowing that the losses of debtors
are limited under the new bankruptcy code, the exchange rate is
not “forced” to the lower level at which bankruptcy occurs. In
these models, changing the rules in the way proposed might result
in the rules themselves never having to be brought into play.)
Finally, the cornerstone of any policy attempting to mitigate
the severity of a financial crisis arising from the volatility of short-
term capital flows must attempt to address the fundamental market
failures associated with that volatility: the fact that some of the
costs (risks) associated with those capital flows are borne by inno-
cent bystanders—the workers and small businessmen who are
crushed either by the direct impact of the volatility or, more
commonly, by the extreme macropolicies that are pursued in an
attempt to moderate crisis effects on exchange rates. While I have
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written extensively elsewhere on those policies, (Stiglitz, 1998a,
1998b), let me here make but three observations.
1. Such policies need to be comprehensive: they need to include
not only the elimination of those distortions that have, in
the past, encouraged short-term capital flows, but also poli-
cies that ensure that banks and financial institutions do not
undertake excessive exposure. But while good financial mar-
ket regulation can go a long way, that is not sufficient: corpo-
rations themselves may engage in excessive borrowing in
foreign denominations, as the experience in Indonesia where
two-thirds of the borrowing was undertaken by corporations,
has brought home forcefully. (To be sure, Malaysia shows
that tight regulation of banks—requiring them to look at the
exposure of the firms to which they lend, can put a significant
damper on corporate foreign borrowing.)
2. Such policies can work, as the experience of Chile has demon-
strated, where a policy that might be interpreted as a tax
on short-term, foreign-denominated debt has succeeded in
lengthening the maturity structure of the foreign debate with
little discernible impact on overall capital flows. Other pro-
posals also look promising, such as those limiting the deduct-
ibility from the corporate income tax of short-term foreign
denominated debt.2
3. Such interventions can be thought of as dams, dams that do
not stop, but only temper the flow of water from the top of
a mountain down to the sea. Without the dam, there are
floods that bring with them death and property destruction.
By contrast, with the dam, not only is the death and destruc-
tion reduced, but the water itself can be channeled into more
constructive uses.
Critics of such interventions have argued that such interventions
will impede the flow of capital and represent an interference with
the free workings of the market. Again, let me repeat: there is a
market failure; these flows give rise to systemic risks that have
large impacts reaching far beyond those directly involved in the
2 There are some significant administrative advantages with this proposal. Any proposal
has to worry about two key issues: the use of derivatives to circumvent the regulations,
and the movement of borrowing offshore. These problems can be addressed, at least in
ways in which the foreign denominated indebtedness imposes less of a threat on the
country’s own macroeconomic stability.
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financial transaction. It is intellectually incoherent to argue that
there is a need for bail outs (or more broadly, that a government
should take actions that have such adverse macroeconomic effects
on its economy), and at the same time maintain that one should
not do something to address the underlying problems that give
rise to these problems. If there is contagion and systemic risks,
there are externalities. It is no more justifiable to complain about
the adverse effects of such interventions in dampening capital
flows than it would be for a steel producer to complain that a tax
on its air pollution induces it to produce less steel. In both cases,
those engaging in socially costly activities are being asked to bear
more fully the social costs of their actions.
4. MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES
No matter how effective we are in reducing the frequency of
crises or in designing policies that mitigate adverse macroeconomic
consequences, such crashes will occur and will lead to economic
downturns. A major lesson is that we must put into place safety
nets, institutional arrangements that help the most vulnerable
within society absorb these shocks.
This will be difficult for many less developed countries. Even
in more developed countries, the agricultural and informal service
sectors are often inadequately covered by unemployment insur-
ance. These sectors of the economy loom large in many LDCs.
We need to recognize the “limbo” stage in which many LDCs
find themselves: they have trod sufficiently far down the transition
road into a modern economy that many of the traditional informal
safety nets—provided by families and villages—have weakened,
but they have not yet gone far enough down the development
path that they have been replaced by adequate formal institutions.
For most LDCs, there is simply no safety net that can substitute
for economic policies that maintain the economy at full employment.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is a much quoted adage that those who do not understand
the past are doomed to repeat it. I do think a dispassionate look
at East Asia is imperative. In doing this, we have to avoid two
dangers. The first is the journalistic anecdotes to which I referred
earlier—looking for easy explanations, particularly explanations
that provide us comfort that the calamity was brought on by some
mistake of those upon whom the disaster has fallen, leaving the
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rest of us in more virtuous countries relatively immune. Certainly,
the contagion that spread around the world in the aftermath of
the Russian crisis has eroded much of the comfort for those who
believed that following “good” polices would protect them against
the ravages of short-term capital market volatility. Secondly, we
cannot rely on our 20/20 hindsight. We need to take seriously
what people knew and expected to happen at the time. Moreover,
we need to look carefully at the explanations offered up by various
participants in the market: each has an incentive to provide expla-
nation that serve their own interests—from shifting blame, to
assuring others that the basic framework that has been at the
center of policy is appropriate.
If there are four central lessons that I draw, they are these:
first, hasty and poorly designed financial and capital market liberal-
ization played a central role in these crises, a far more important
role that the host of other commonly cited factors. Second, there
are important reforms in the global financial architecture—
including reforms in the bankruptcy laws and attempts to stabilize
the highly volatile flows of short-term capital—which are essential
if the advantages of globalization are to be achieved without im-
posing undue risks. Third, economic models that fail to integrate
modern financial economics into an analysis of the real sector
simply will not do. Too much of the analysis in the recent crisis
focused on financial variables—victory was declared when ex-
change rates were stabilized, even as the economies were plunging
into deep recession. Attention needs to be placed on the social,
structural, and human dimensions, on the implications of the poli-
cies for unemployment, bankruptcy, the flow of credit, as well as
for the overall strength of the economy.
Fourth, and most importantly, there needs to be greater congru-
ence between the exposure to risks, the ability to bear risks, and
the policy responses. Small countries are like small boats on a
rough sea. Even with a well-steered, sturdy boat, they are eventu-
ally likely to be hit broad side by a big wave. Knowing this, they
should have a good set of safety vests, and they should take great
care when venturing into dangerous shoals. The less-developed
countries, even before they had fully mastered the techniques of
steering and before all the holes in the boat were fully plugged,
were reconfigured to make them more sleek, but less stable, and
encouraged to set out into some of the stormiest seas and worst
conditions possible—and no time was given to make sure that
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everyone had a safety vest. The results were predictable. Let us
take to heart these lessons.
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